

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ENERGY

)	
Investigation by the Department on its own motion,)	
pursuant to G.L. c.159 § § 12 and 16, into the)	
collocation security policies of Verizon New)	D.T.E. 02-8
England Inc. d/b/a Verizon Massachusetts)	
)	

REPLY BRIEF OF VERIZON MASSACHUSETTS

I. INTRODUCTION

In their initial briefs,¹ the other parties shed very little light on the issues that the Department opened this investigation to examine. They have failed to impeach the inherent reasonableness of Verizon Massachusetts’ (“Verizon MA”) collocation security proposal. Contrary to other parties’ claims, Verizon MA’s proposal is not a drastic or radical departure from existing practices, but rather builds on current collocation security procedures to better safeguard the network from potential harm.

The other parties concede, as they must, that Verizon MA’s network is interconnected with those of other telecommunications providers in Massachusetts. Damage to Verizon’s network would adversely affect them and their customers. Yet, while the other parties devote hundreds of pages to imagined flaws in Verizon MA’s proposals, they offer very few suggestions of their own. At most, they claim that Verizon’s existing security measures, either alone or with modest enhancements — all to be implemented solely at Verizon’s expense — are sufficient.

¹ The following parties filed initial briefs in this proceeding: Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (“Allegiance” or “AL”), AT&T Communications of New England (“AT&T”), Covad Communications Company (“Covad”), Qwest Communications Corporation (“Qwest”), Sprint Communications Company (“Sprint”), WorldCom, Inc. (“WCOM”), the Office of the Attorney General (“Attorney General” or “AG”), and Verizon Massachusetts (“Verizon MA” or “VZ MA”).

This claim fails for many reasons, among them the collocators' disregard of basic Verizon MA security policies, currently in place, such as those requiring the return of identification badges and access cards issued to collocator personnel who leave their employment.

The bottom line is that the other parties are unwilling to suffer any inconvenience or bear any additional cost to increase the security of the network on which they admittedly rely. They either discount network security risks or expect Verizon MA to bear the entire responsibility and cost of protecting that network. Their objective is clear — to obtain a “free lunch” of enhanced network security at Verizon's expense, thereby enhancing their competitive position. One example of this is the grumbling that greeted Verizon MA's policy requiring collocators to share responsibility for security by certifying that they have conducted background checks on their own employees as a condition of obtaining new Verizon access cards. Tr. 614-15. The other parties' self-serving positions do a disservice to the Department and to the people of Massachusetts.

In contrast to the non-proposals of the other parties, Verizon MA has proposed reasonable, effective, and *proactive* methods to protect Verizon MA's central office (“CO”) locations and remote terminal equipment enclosures (“RTEE”) and reduce the potential risk of harm to the telecommunications network infrastructure. Accordingly, the Department should reject the other parties' unsubstantiated claims and adopt Verizon MA's proposal. That proposal provides the reasonable *preventive* measures to better protect Verizon MA's investments, preserve its and the other carriers' networks, and maintain its ability to provide continuous and reliable service for its end user and carrier customers by ensuring a more secure collocated environment.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Other Parties' Recommendation that the Department Take No Action to Heighten Security Measures in Verizon MA's Collocated Offices Is Unreasonable and Imprudent.

1. The Absence of Serious Service-Affecting Incidents Does Not Justify Inaction.

The Department should reject the suggestion that it take no additional action to enhance network security because there have been no network-affecting incidents in Massachusetts to date. AG Brief at 1-2; AL Brief at 8; WCOM Brief at 1, 16; Covad Brief at 6; Qwest Brief at 8. An important objective of this investigation is *prevention*. It is imprudent to wait until a serious network disruption occurs before implementing Verizon's reasonable, effective, and *proactive* proposals to protect Verizon MA's CO locations and RTEEs in Massachusetts and reducing the potential risk of harm to the telecommunications network infrastructure.² That there have been no serious service-disrupting incidents in Massachusetts is not cause for complacency.

Some parties discount the risks to the telecommunications infrastructure, in an attempt to show that Verizon's proposal is unnecessary. For example, AT&T's claims that telecommunications facilities in Massachusetts are "low risk" (AT&T Brief at 10) is unsubstantiated and is contrary to threat warnings that the federal government issued after September 11th. VZ MA Brief at 20. Qwest, in turn, argues that transport fiber is a more likely

² In its brief, Covad renews its previous request to establish a task force in lieu of this investigation. Covad Brief at 7. The Hearing Officer previously rejected such a motion. Hearing Officer Ruling On Motion Of AT&T, Sprint, Global Naps, Covad, Conversent, and Allegiance To Suspend Current Litigation Proceedings and To Establish An Industry Task Force On Network Security In Lieu Of Divisive Litigation And Request For Expedited Ruling On The Motion, at 5 (May 6, 2002). Other parties recommend that the Department adopt whatever measures are developed by national task forces, such as the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council ("NPIC") and the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee ("NSTAC"). See e.g., Exh. Qwest 1, at 7; Exh. Sprint 1, at 5. While those task forces are performing an important national function, and may eventually make useful recommendations, the Department can and should evaluate measures that can be implemented in Massachusetts now to enhance network security. The relevant issues have been discussed in this proceeding, and deferring to another task force would create unnecessary delay. As the Hearing Officer stated, this proceeding "is the more appropriate method to reach *timely* and *specific* results." May 6th Order, at 5.

target than central offices for an attack on telecommunications facilities. Tr. 589-90. However, Qwest agrees that central offices are the termination points for interoffice facilities, and that many transport fibers may terminate in a central office. Tr. 610-11, see also Tr. 165 (COs house toll transmission equipment). Thus, even under Qwest's assumption, central offices may be very inviting targets for a terrorist attack.

Central offices are key points in the telecommunications network. As Verizon's experience with its West Street facility after September 11th showed, a disabled CO (by whatever cause) can have devastating consequences for the social and economic well-being of the community. See *Vote and Order to Open Investigation*, January 24, 2002, at 6. Those consequences are magnified by the fact that collocators interconnect with and use parts of Verizon MA's network. Allegiance's Ms. Perrott described the relationship in detail:

We are interconnected with Verizon's network. We use your transport throughout our network. We lease DS-3 facilities, fiber facilities from Verizon. Just like our network is interconnected, your network is interconnected -- if you take out a portion of ours or yours, we're all down.

Tr. 412.

The Department should disregard Covad's irresponsible contention (Covad Brief at 14) that Verizon MA is exploiting the September 11th tragedy to effect anticompetitive changes in collocation. Verizon MA did not fabricate the issues in this case. Instead, the Department recognized that there might be security issues surrounding the presence of CLEC personnel in Verizon MA central office after September 11th, and opened this proceeding to investigate security measures pertaining to collocators' personnel so as to prevent human tampering. Specifically, the Department's *Vote and Order* said:

On September 11, 2001, catastrophic damage to Verizon's West Street facility in Manhattan vividly illustrated the consequences of losing a central office. While not all risks are on par with such an

event, nonetheless, in response to the events on September 11th, the Department determines that it should review its earlier findings concerning Verizon collocation security issues. . . . The purpose of this investigation is to review our prior findings with respect to Verizon's security procedures and measures *that apply to personnel of competing carriers in accessing their collocation sites in Verizon's central offices and other facilities (e.g., remote terminals)*, and to determine which, if any, policies should be strengthened to safeguard telecommunications networks from human tampering to ensure reliable telecommunications service in Massachusetts.

Vote and Order, at 6 (emphasis added). Because serious consequences can result from damage to central offices, the Department correctly recognized that it should take steps to prevent such damage.

2. The Lack of Service Disruptions Supports, Rather than Defeats, the Need for Verizon MA's Proposal.

A number of parties argue that there is no proof that separating collocator personnel from Verizon MA equipment would be effective in reducing threats to the network. *See e.g.*, AG Brief at 1; AL Brief at 4, 6-8; Covad Brief at 13; Qwest Brief at 4; Sprint Brief at 11. To the contrary, that there have been no service-disrupting incidents in Massachusetts may be a result of Verizon MA's policy to establish separate and secured space for physical collocation, as well as separate entrances or pathways for use by collocators to access collocation areas. Verizon MA's experience demonstrates the benefits of limiting access to Verizon MA equipment and other areas in the central office where collocators' personnel have no reason to be.

Some parties argue that the lack of serious network incidents counsels against the Department's adopting any new policies. *See e.g.*, AL Brief at 8; Qwest Brief at 7-8; WorldCom Brief at 1. That does not provide enough protection to the network and customers of all carriers. Verizon MA's separated space policy is just that — a policy. Some parties seek to eliminate that policy. AL Brief at 11-12; Sprint Brief at 28. Therefore, Verizon MA seeks explicit Department

sanction to maintain the separate space policy. In addition, Verizon MA proposes to expand the policy to include cageless collocation as well. Unsecured CCOE arrangements, in which collocators' equipment may be located in non-segregated areas in Verizon MA's central offices, pose a risk. Obtaining Department sanction for Verizon MA's policy of separate and secure collocation space will help to ensure that Verizon MA can continue the policy going forward.

3. The Other Parties Misstate the Purpose of Individual Building Risk Assessments.

Likewise, it is not appropriate to require Verizon MA to complete "risk assessments" for each central office, as some parties argue. *See e.g.*, AL Brief at 5-6; AG Brief at 2, 5; WCOM Brief at 11; AT&T Brief at 11-13. The other parties misunderstand or misstate the role that risk assessments played and should play in Verizon MA's proposal.

During the hearing, the term "risk assessment" was used in a variety of ways. Tr. 194-97. AT&T (pp. 11-13) and others confound the various definitions and paint a distorted picture of Verizon MA's testimony and its risk assessment efforts.³ A typical physical security risk assessment is done on a building-specific basis. Such an assessment would consider the amount of criminal activity in the neighborhood, based on information from the local police department or the state, as well as a determination of the kind of equipment located in the building. Tr. 28.

Verizon MA's proposal is not based exclusively on building-by-building risk assessments.⁴ Instead, the risks to Verizon MA's network from collocators' personnel are not site-specific. Therefore, it is not necessary to conduct a building-specific assessment to evaluate those risks. Tr. 198-201. Verizon MA's proposal addresses security concerns that are generic to

³ AT&T deliberately confounds the different meanings. Its security expert, Mr. Paszynsky, asserted, "the term 'risk assessment' has been used incessantly the last day and a half, and I think it's been used incorrectly." Tr. 486.

⁴ One aspect of Verizon MA's proposal, the determination by the Department of which offices to consider

central offices with collocation, and is based on “the fact that limiting access was a basic security principle.” Tr. 40. This basic principle has not been refuted.

Finally, AT&T should not complain about Verizon MA’s supposed failure to conduct building-specific risk assessments. Despite having far fewer facilities in Massachusetts than Verizon MA,⁵ AT&T has not conducted building-specific risk assessments of its facilities in this state. Tr. 438-39.

B. Verizon MA’s Proposal Is Neither Unlawful nor Anti-Competitive.

1. Verizon’s Proposal Has a Sound Legal Basis.

Contrary to the other parties’ claims (AL Brief at 3, 13-15; AT&T Brief at 13-14, 30-32; Sprint Brief at 17-19, 21-23, 26-28, 34; Covad Brief at 11-12, 15; Qwest Brief at 12, 15-16; WorldCom Brief at 7) Verizon MA’s proposed measures are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Act”) and the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) decisions enforcing the Act.

First, current law does not prohibit the Department from adopting Verizon MA’s proposal. Security concerns are an aspect of the technical feasibility constraint that limits the availability of physical collocation. The law allows restricting physical collocation space to space that is separate from space housing Verizon MA’s equipment, and requiring access to the collocation space through separate entrances and pathways. 47 C.F.R. § 51.323(i)(4) & (6); VZ MA Brief at 11-12.

“critical,” and limited to virtual collocation, would be done on a building-specific basis.

⁵ AT&T’s Mr. Gorham identified two AT&T central office facilities in Massachusetts. Tr. 437. Ex. AT&T-VZ-1-1 identifies four other AT&T locations.

Verizon MA satisfies all the criteria established by the FCC for implementing its proposed restrictions. The separated space is comparable, from a technical and engineering standpoint,⁶ to unsecured space; is available within the same time frame; is provided at no added cost beyond the applicable, flat-rated space conditioning charge; and would be imposed on physical collocation space provided to a Verizon affiliate. 47 C.F.R. §51.323(i)(4)(ii), (iii), (iv), (v); Tr. 36-37, 243-47, 265-66. Similarly, Verizon MA's proposal for separate entrances satisfies the applicable legal requirements: it is necessary to address "legitimate security concerns" or "operational constraints," is technically feasible, would not result in provisioning delays, and would have little or no additional cost impact on the collocators.⁷

Likewise, contrary to other parties' arguments (*e.g.*, AT&T Brief at 6; Sprint Brief at 30-31, 33; Covad Brief at 18-19) the Department is not prohibited by any FCC rules from restricting CRTEE to virtual arrangements only. *FCC Reconsideration Order*⁸ ¶ 104; Ex. VZ MA 2 at 13-14. There are many physical and technical differences between central offices and RTEEs that make secure, separated physical collocation technically infeasible. Thus, Verizon MA's

⁶ The separated space is equipped with the appropriate power (both AC and DC), heat, ventilation, air conditioning, and lighting to enable the carrier's technicians to work on collocated equipment in that space. Tr. 247-48.

⁷ Under extraordinary circumstances, if Verizon MA incurred substantial costs to create a separate entrance or pathway in a CO, the Company may seek to apply a special construction charge to recover those costs from the cost-causer, *i.e.*, the collocated carriers. Tr. 266. Permitting Verizon MA to recover its additional security-related costs from the collocators is fully consistent with the longstanding economic cost recovery principle of cost causation. Exh. VZ MA 1, at 40. The special construction charge is a tariffed rate developed on a time and materials basis, pro-rated over the square footage, and applied proportionately to all carriers in a CO based on their collocated space. Tr. 267, 739. Verizon MA does not anticipate that this situation would arise, nor has Verizon MA ever applied or quoted such a charge in the past in Massachusetts. Tr. 740.

⁸ *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket Nos. 98-147 & 96-98, Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 00-297 (rel. August 2000) ("*FCC Reconsideration Order*").

proposal that all collocation in RTEEs be restricted to virtual collocation is entirely justified. VZ MA Brief at 37-38; Ex. VZ MA 1 at 36-38.

Finally, the parties' mischaracterizations of Verizon MA's proposals for access to shared space (AT&T Brief at 6;⁹ WCOM Brief at 7-8; Covad Brief at 18) do not obscure the fact that Verizon's proposals are both reasonable and legally permissible. Collocators' technicians would have access to shared facilities if they could access those facilities without entering Verizon MA's equipment areas. An escort would only be required to the extent that the collocator's technician had to traverse Verizon MA's equipment space to access the shared facilities. Tr. 224-25; VZ MA Brief at 35-36. This is consistent with FCC requirements to provide "reasonable" — not unrestricted — access to shared facilities. Exh. VZ MA 1, at 35; *Advanced Services Order*¹⁰, ¶ 49.

2. Verizon's Proposal is Not Anti-Competitive.

Contrary to some parties' claims, Verizon MA's collocation security proposal is not anti-competitive, and would not unduly interfere with providing carriers reasonable access to their collocated facilities. In fact, the additional security will benefit other carriers by enhancing the security and reliability of their networks, which are interconnected with Verizon's. Tr. 62, 112, 139.

The facts do not support the other parties' conclusory claims that competition would be diminished if Verizon MA's plan were adopted. See e.g., Qwest Brief at 10-11, 18; Sprint Brief at 35-36; WCOM Brief at 9-10. The immediate impact on other carriers is minimal. Only one

⁹ AT&T's claim that collocators "would have to call ahead for an escort for a technician to go potty," Tr. 466, while colorful, inaccurately reflects Verizon MA's proposal and adds little substance to the discussion.

¹⁰ See *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket No. 98-147, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761, at ¶ 49 (March 31, 1999) ("*Advanced Services Order*").

currently unseparated CCOE arrangement in Hopkinton would be converted to a virtual arrangement. Covad, the carrier that has that arrangement, claimed that if it were converted to virtual collocation, it would cease providing service using that arrangement. However, Covad's claim was completely unsubstantiated and lacking credibility.

Covad services a virtual private network for one very large customer in the Hopkinton area through its collocation arrangement. Tr. 566. It offered no specific technical, contractual, or other reason why it could not continue to serve that customer under a virtual arrangement. It offered no evidence that a competitor could, or how a competitor might, suddenly offer better or cheaper service to that customer if the collocation arrangement were converted to a virtual arrangement.¹¹ *Id.* Instead, Covad simply threatened to take its ball and go home. The Department should disregard Covad's bluster.

There is also no evidence to support the claims that a separate space policy will prematurely exhaust the space available for physical collocation in Verizon MA's COs. There is no evidence to suggest that there is a shortage of physical collocation space in Massachusetts (other than Hopkinton). Indeed, as other parties point out (*e.g.*, Sprint Brief at 8), the evidence shows that because of consolidation in the industry, the number of collocation arrangements in Massachusetts had decreased since 2000. Tr. 732-33. This has made additional collocation space available and alleviated any space shortages that the other parties imagined.

Moreover, there is no merit to the allegations that Verizon MA has already determined which central offices are "critical" without any collocators having a say in the matter. *See e.g.*, AL Brief at 17. First, Verizon has not suggested that any particular central offices should or should not be critical, virtual collocation-only COs. Instead, Verizon MA has proposed a set of

¹¹ Presumably, that competitor would collocate in the Hopkinton central office, as Covad did.

criteria and a process for designating COs as critical in the future. Verizon MA expects that the Department will apply the criteria that the Department deems appropriate, and that the Department may augment or modify Verizon MA's proposed criteria. Tr. 84-85, 154. Until the Department determines what criteria to use, it is speculative whether any COs would qualify at this time and which collocators (if any) might be affected. Further, Verizon MA does not propose to exclude collocators from the process.¹² Verizon MA's concern with the confidentiality of the proceedings was that the discussion of which COs should be designated crucial, and on what basis, should not be conducted in public. It is the public discussion of that information which raises concerns about security and potential disclosure of confidential business information. Verizon MA has stated explicitly that collocators could and should be part of that process. Tr. 261-62.

3. Virtual Collocation Is a Viable, Pro-competitive Collocation Option.

The other parties' criticisms of virtual collocation are not supported by any specific evidence and are merely theoretical. AL Brief at 26-27; AT&T Brief at 17-23, WCOM Brief at 4-5; Covad Brief at 4-5; Qwest Brief at 18. To the contrary, virtual collocation is recognized as a viable option by the FCC and under the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6). It is technically feasible. It is used by a number of collocators in Massachusetts. Some collocators prefer it even when physical collocation is available. Tr. 739.¹³ Provisioning intervals may even be less for a virtual collocation arrangement than a physical arrangement. VZ MA Brief at 55; Tr. 548-49. There are no additional costs associated with a virtual collocation arrangement. Thus, the Department

¹² Allegiance's description of a "star chamber" in which collocators' due process rights are trampled (AL Brief at 17-18) is another example of the other parties' rhetorical excess that inflames but does not illuminate.

¹³ Sixty percent of the virtual collocation arrangements in Massachusetts were the collocator's choice. *Id.*

should disregard the parties' unsubstantiated claims that virtual collocation is not a viable arrangement.

Whatever criticisms the other parties level at virtual collocation, they have no basis in experience in Massachusetts. A number of parties have or have had virtual collocation arrangements in Massachusetts, without significant performance issues. Verizon MA Brief at 54. Only one party, Covad, has withdrawn a virtual collocation arrangement in Massachusetts, but that was due to Covad's own operational issues related to loop qualifications in remote offices. It had nothing to do with the fact that the arrangement was virtual, not physical. Tr. 571-73. None of Allegiance's more than twenty virtual collocation arrangements is in Massachusetts. Tr. 408-09.

Those criticisms also have no relevance to Verizon MA's current provisioning and maintenance performance for virtual collocation arrangements. The other parties' experiences with virtual collocation predate the creation of Verizon's former separate data affiliate, Verizon Advanced Data Inc. ("VADI"), in the latter part of 2000. Tr. 409-10. Verizon MA provisioned and maintained over one hundred virtual collocation arrangements for VADI in Massachusetts during that period from late 2000 to April 2002, gaining much experience and expertise in the process. Tr. 51, 93, 737.

B. Contrary to Others Parties' Claims, Enforcing and Enhancing Verizon MA's Existing Security Procedures Alone Are Insufficient to Protect and Preserve the Network Infrastructure

Verizon MA demonstrated in its Initial Brief why mere enhancements to existing security measures are insufficient. VZ MA Brief Part III.D. Nothing in the other parties' briefs refutes this showing. Nonetheless, a few additional comments in response to the other parties' briefs are in order.

It is inescapable that security measures must be properly employed to be effective. Tr. 507. Yet, as described in Verizon MA's Initial Brief, collocators routinely disregard basic Verizon MA security policies — such as the requirement to return to identification and access cards when no longer needed because the collocator's employee has ceased employment. VZ MA Brief at 45.

AT&T continues to tout the alleged benefits of an anti-passback feature on card reader access systems, and criticizes Verizon for not employing such a feature. AT&T Brief at 38-39. If these systems were so effective, however, one would expect other carriers to deploy them universally. They do not. AT&T itself does not deploy anti-passback capability at its Massachusetts locations. Tr. 436-37. Similarly, Qwest uses this feature only “in some cases.” Tr. 594.

There is another important reason not to deploy anti-passback systems in Verizon MA central offices — the collocators would not stand for them. A collocator's technician who does not “swipe out” properly is denied re-entry to the office until his or her identity is checked and access card is reset by a Verizon service center. So, a technician who forgets to swipe out before exiting the CO to retrieve a tool or spare part may be delayed in completing a service order. Tr. 287-88 (dialog between Hearing Officer J. Evans and Verizon witness L. Reney); Exh. VZ MA 2, at 24. Various parties in this case suggested that their ability to restore service quickly was a major, or perhaps the only, way to compete with Verizon. *See e.g.*, Tr. 445 (AT&T), 514 (WCOM), 526 (Sprint); WCOM Brief at 4. It would not take many instances of repairs delayed while a technician waits for his or her access card to be reset before collocators began clamoring for Verizon to disable the feature.

The other parties' attempts to micromanage Verizon MA's deployment of security devices¹⁴ fail to address the real issue — that increased foot traffic in central offices poses a security risk. There can be no argument that restricting access by unauthorized persons to particular areas is a standard security measure. Tr. 40. Examples are evident every day and everywhere. Airports do not allow persons without tickets to approach terminal gates. Tr. 60-61. Government and private buildings alike have restricted access. The Department itself does not allow everyone visiting the South Station food court to enter the Department's offices; instead, after September 11th, the Department instituted new procedures under which visitors must present appropriate identification and sign in at the guard station. No other telecommunications carrier in Massachusetts allows other carriers' personnel free access to its equipment. AT&T and other carriers use guards, escorts, separate entrances, and card access systems to restrict access to their facilities in Massachusetts. *See e.g.*, VZ MA Brief at 58-59.

Collocation in Verizon MA central offices undeniably increases the foot traffic in those offices. The presence in a Verizon MA central office of up to twenty-seven collocators, each with approximately five associated personnel — not including vendors of those collocated carriers — can result in over one hundred additional persons having access. It defies common sense for other parties to argue that such additional traffic poses no additional security risk that Verizon should take measures to address.

¹⁴ AT&T's continued insistence that Verizon MA implement anti-passback features in card-reader systems is mysterious in light of Mr. Paszynsky's strong criticism of the degree to which the parties focused on security devices rather than other security issues:

I'm absolutely astonished at how so much of the testimony has been directed to only one of those apexes -- namely, the devices. We've talked about card readers. We've talked about CCTV. Even this morning we got as granular as talking about JPEG and MPEG files and how they work. Ninety percent, once again, of all security failures occurs not in the devices, it occurs in the linkage between the people apex and the procedure/policy apex.

C. The Collocators' Lack of Commitment to Share Security Responsibility Shows that Verizon's Proposals are Necessary.

The other parties' suggestion that no more than existing measures are needed ring hollow in light of their profound lack of commitment to Verizon's existing collocation security policies. Collocators routinely disregard Verizon MA's security measures. And, although some parties in this case argue that *Verizon MA* should enhance existing security measures, the parties consistently shirk responsibility to share the costs and burdens of such measures. The collocators' profound lack of commitment to existing or enhanced Verizon security measures demonstrates conclusively why stricter measures, such as mandatory separation of Verizon MA equipment, are necessary.

Security must be a shared responsibility. For example, Verizon MA depends on collocators to maintain control of Verizon identification and access cards issued to their technicians and to return them when employees cease their employment with the collocator. As Qwest's security director, Mr. Adragna, pointed out, that is a "very difficult" problem for the incumbent local exchange carrier:

[I]t is difficult, with anybody -- a contractor, a CLEC, or a CLEC contractor, whether it's a Qwest contractor or someone else's -- very difficult for you to know if they're being truthful with you about their head count and their staff. We feel that we have a good-enough relationship with both of those groups that we feel comfortable with we're, I would say, 95 percent sure. You can't be sure, because you can't ever know when someone's telling you the truth. It's very difficult.

Tr. 596-97.

Unfortunately, based on experience, Verizon MA cannot be so sure as Qwest. The evidence (Tr. 354) shows that at least three of the six collocators who participated in the hearings in this case do not comply with Verizon MA's policy regarding return of access and

Tr. at 462.

identification cards — far from the 95% confidence rate cited by Mr. Andragna. Moreover, when confronted with their failures, not a single one of these collocators admitted its mistake and committed to do better. Tr. 411, 508-09, 552. The collocators' lax approach results in gaps in security, which make implementation of Verizon MA's proposals necessary.

Profoundly lacking from the parties in this case is any commitment to share in the cost or burden of enhanced security measures or to suffer any consequence for failure to comply with such measures. While the other parties' briefs are full of suggestions as to what *Verizon MA* should do, there is no mention of what *collocators* should do to enhance the security of the network on which they all rely to provide service. Sprint claims, for example, "Given that Verizon is the cost causer of its proposals, it should pay the entire cost of their implementation." Sprint Brief at 13-14. AT&T states, "the Department may wish to consider requiring *Verizon* to take certain steps . . . to protect the public switched network." AT&T Brief at 34 (emphasis added). Qwest complains about Verizon's policy to require collocators to conduct background checks on their own employees as a condition of obtaining new credentials to enter Verizon facilities, citing resource and cost issues, and suggests that Verizon MA should itself perform the checks. Tr. 615; Qwest Brief at 22-23.

The other parties' recalcitrance is also shown by their negative responses to the Hearing Officer's hypothetical question whether they would be willing to accept escorted access as a compromise alternative to virtual collocation. Tr. 423, 472, 515; AL Brief at 28; WCOM Brief at 8. These responses demonstrate the parties' intransigent refusal to accept any inconvenience or costs to enhance security at Verizon MA central offices. All the while, they want unlimited physical collocation and unrestricted access.

Though the other parties are quick to say, “we have as much interest in everything functioning properly as Verizon would” (Tr. 412-13), and “on the issue of network security, all carriers are on the same side” (Covad Brief at 13), their statements are belied by their lack of commitment to share the responsibility, effort, and cost to maintain network security. Security requires some cost and effort. If the collocators were sincere in statements like that above, they would acknowledge that they should share the costs and burdens of protecting the network they share. They have not. To the contrary, the primary goal of many collocators seems to be avoiding such cost and inconvenience. The lack of evenhandedness in the collocators’ arguments suggests that their objective is to obtain a competitive advantage by shifting to Verizon MA all the costs and effort of providing security at those offices while incurring no cost and suffering no inconvenience themselves.

The collocators’ lack of attention and commitment to Verizon MA’s security measures diminishes the effectiveness of such measures. Therefore, it is necessary for the Department to do more than merely maintain a possibly enhanced status quo. To accomplish this, Verizon MA proposes to separate collocator personnel from Verizon MA equipment and to include reasonable restrictions on the movements of CLEC personnel in Verizon MA central offices. Verizon MA’s proposals are reasonable, appropriate, and effective. The Department should adopt them.

III. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in Verizon MA’s Initial Brief and above, the most effective means of ensuring network reliability for its carrier and end-user customers is to restrict access by collocator personnel to Verizon equipment in all COs and to RTs and certain critical COs entirely. Contrary to the parties’ unsubstantiated claims, Verizon MA’s proposals are lawful and non-discriminatory. Moreover, they reduce the risk of harm to facilities and personnel, while

allowing for competition. Verizon MA's proposals would also maintain and enhance existing security procedures, and has minimal effect on existing collocation arrangements. Accordingly, Verizon MA's collocation security proposals are reasonable and should be approved.

Respectfully submitted,

VERIZON MASSACHUSETTS

By its attorneys,

Barbara Anne Sousa
Gregory M. Kennan
185 Franklin Street, 13th Floor
Boston, Massachusetts 02110-1585
(617) 743-7331
(617) 743-2255
(617) 737-0648 fax

Dated: August 23, 2002